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Abstract
As the use of the Internet and other computer networks to transact business
grows, there is an ever increasing need for those taking part in those transac-
tions to understand the risks of doing so. While there are many web sites that
have created valuable databases of specific vulnerabilities for certain types
of hardware and software, there is a lack of focus on attempting to analyze
the interaction of businesses, their systems, computer networks, and their
customers and the risks that are created by either intended or unattended
interactions. EcomRISK.org is a web site that presents a clear taxonomy to
classify these risks and provides other features to aid in the general discussion
of e-commerce risk. The site, and the taxonomy at the center of it, creates
a database of these incidents so they can be clearly searched. This paper
discusses the creation of EcomRISK.org, from vision to birth.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Electronic commerce (e-commerce) has become a critical part of everyone’s
life, whether they directly realize it or not. More and more businesses and
consumers are using the Internet, along with other electronic networks, to
transact business. The use of electronic networks to transact business spans
from the average consumer buying a book from Amazon.com to General Mo-
tors using a web-based parts and service system for their dealers and suppli-
ers [1]. E-commerce has the same potentials for abuse as regular commerce:
people can steal, cheat, over-charge, illegally collect personal information,
and, in general, defraud one another. However, e-commerce, as a class of
business, can fundamentally change the ways these crimes are perpetrated
and the frequency of certain types of crimes.
EcomRISK.org is a new web site that creates a on-line community based
on the discussion and examination of the risks of performing e-commerce.
The site features many useful tools to foster an on-line community. The
purpose of the site, as stated in the Professor Makedon’s original proposal, is
to ”document and collect e-commerce risk cases and misuses in a quantifiable
manner.” [2] The very first question one might ask is, what is meant by
e-commerce? Professor Makedon states that ”E-Commerce is a new socio-
economic force which provides business solutions based on the use of the
Internet.” [2] A slightly more precise definition that I found on the Web is:
E-commerce may be defined as ‘the technology, processing, and
operations which occur when business transactions are done auto-
matically over networks, using IT.’ In other words, the scheme of
the total system, even including operation. Included in the term
1
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e-commerce are transactions between businesses and consumers
(B to C), businesses and businesses (B to B), as well as operations
internal to companies, the conversion of government procurement
to electronic systems, and transactions between consumers. [3]
This definition encompasses all of the prevalent forms of e-commerce that we
want to address.
Now we come to the question, what is an e-commerce risk? Professor
Makedon states “To understand the risks of electronic commerce specifically,
is to understand the risks of abusing or misusing different types of information
and at different levels of transactions.” [2]. As a result of the last nine months
of work, this definition has become somewhat expanded. An e-commerce risk
is the improper use of information at any level of storage or transaction or
the violation of the behavior intended by the designers of a network for the
clients of the network. The first part of the definition is fairly self explanatory.
Business transactions involve the transfer of information. It is the misuse
of this information that presents the main risk. The second part of the
definition, relating to the violation of intended behavior, is meant to add the
class of denial of service (DoS) problems to the realm of those that fall under
e-commerce risks. Some examples of typical high-level risks are:
• Security breaches of hardware and software systems supporting e-commerce
transactions.
• Un-ethical mining of databases, by both the owners of a database and
the users, allowing the person to glean new, private, and not specifically
released data about a person.
• Insider problems of company or government information abuse.
• DoS attacks to commercial, government, or private web-sites or other
types of information servers.
This list is intended to give just a high overview of what potential risks
are. One need not go very far to read about examples of these risks in the
real world. A quick browse through the news section1 of EcomRISK.org can
reveal many current examples:
1This can be found at http://devlabserver.cs.dartmouth.edu/sites/ecomrisk/news/.
Our main news feed comes from the Institute of Security Technology Studies at Dart-
mouth College.
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• The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) at Carnegie Mellon
University was hit with a DoS attack lasting for 30 hours during 23rd
and 24th of May 2001. [4]
• The official White Hours web-site (http://www.whitehouse.gov/) was
also hit with a DoS attack the same week as CERT. [5]
• Data mining is already in heavy use by many corporations, such as
“Bank of America, People’s Bank, Sundance, Equifax, Reader’s Digest,
Group 1, Marriott, and The Washington Post.” [6]
The above list just scratches the surface of the risks faced by those involved
in e-commerce.
The first task in the EcomRISK.org’s creation was to create a taxonomy
that would allow us to accept and classify these risks. This taxonomy lies
at the heart of the site and took much of our development time. However,
the development of the site did not stop with the creation of a classification
system. We added a large set of features to the site that we felt would aid in
the discussion of e-commerce risks. In Figure 1.1 a sample of the main page
of EcomRISK.org is shown.
Over the course of the rest of the paper, I will discuss how we went about
creating our site. From a discussion of the business analysis Carey Heckman
brought to the group, which helped narrow in on a target audience, to the
technological underpinnings of the site, design of the taxonomy, other features
of the site, and, finally, the status and future plan for the site.
1.1 Project History
During the fall term of my senior year (2000-01) as an undergraduate major-
ing in Computer Science at Dartmouth College, I became involved with the
department’s DEVLAB and Professor Makedon’s projects on e-commerce.
The projects centered around the creation of a number of on-line resources
relating to e-commerce and the wide array of issues brought up by this new
phenomenon. The parent site, named GREeCOM.org2 (GREeCOM.org’s
logo is shown in Figure 1.2) , was originally the main focus of development.
Our intention was to develop a site the provided a forum to discuss and
classify the risks of performing e-commerce, a place to learn about the latest
2GREeCOM stands for Global Research & Education in E-commerce.
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Figure 1.1: A screen-shot of EcomRISK.org’s main page.
technological developments relating to e-commerce, and a place to provide a
certification of users showing that they had reached some above average level
of knowledge about the world of e-commerce. Originally it was our intention
to place all of this functionality into one site. However, the group that had
assembled to work on the site felt that in order to maximize the value of each
piece, we should separate the main functions we were attempting to provide
into several sites.
Professor Makedon had laid out her intentions in this area in a proposal
to create the EcomRISK3 Data Center. When I joined the project I took
over the creation of this data center. We turned her idea of a database
3EcomRISK is a mixture of the term e-commerce and the word risk: the RISK in the
name is not an acronym.
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Figure 1.2: GREeCOM.org’s Logo
into a web site named EcomRISK.org. The other two functions originally
planned for GREeCOM.org were separated into their own sites as well, named
eJETA.org4 (eJETA.org’s logo is shown in Figure 1.3) and DePolicy.org5
Figure 1.3: eJETA.org’s Logo
(DePolicy.org’s logo is shown in Figure 1.4). GREeCOM.org became the
umbrella site handling user registration and other services common across
the three sites.
4eJETA stands for the ”Electronic Journal on E-commerce Tools & Applications”.
5The history of the name “DePolicy” is quite lengthy - however it is instructive enough
to know that DePolicy.org is “The Center of Learning and Self-Testing on E-Commerce
Policies & Technologies”.
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Figure 1.4: DePolicy.org’s Logo
I became the main developer EcomRISK.org, however, I would be remiss
if I did not give a large amount of the credit for the development of the look
and feel to our web master Sue Anne Johnson and our server’s administra-
tor Tilmann Steinberg. My intention was to build the site with Professor
Makedon’s proposal as a guide.
While my main focus was the development of EcomRISK.org, over the
course of the last three terms I have been involved in the development of
the GREeCOM.org center as a whole. Many of the technologies I devel-
oped for the EcomRISK.org site have been adopted for use in the other sites
(eJETA.org and DePolicy.org) such as the resources database, the working
paper database and viewer, the news system, the forum system, the survey
system, and a few others.
1.2 Acknowledgments
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1.3 Technical Note
As of the release date of this document, we are still in the process of tying
the domain name EcomRISK.org to our server. The web site can be accessed
at http://devlabserver.cs.dartmouth.edu/sites/ecomrisk/ .
Chapter 2
Business Analysis
2.1 Market Analysis
2.1.1 PEST Analysis
In order to determine what the potential user base for our site was and,
therefore, what design principles we should follow we used the well known
PEST analysis. The letters of PEST stand for political, economic, social,
and technological. This analysis attempts to identify the trends in these
four areas in order to determine if the trends exist to provide a wide enough
audience for our site.
1. Political
(a) On-line criminal activity is more prevalent.
(b) Law enforcement is having to deal with the regulation of e-commerce.
(c) Does tax policy need to be re-written to take e-commerce into
account?
(d) Privacy (or Big Brother) is becoming more of an issue.
(e) E-Commerce is beginning to transcend national boundaries.
(f) There is increasing concern and interest among the population at
large.
(g) The U.S. Government itself is doing more and more of its own
business on-line..
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(h) There is a general shift in the policy focus from libertarian ideals
to more conservative ideals.
2. Economic
(a) E-Commerce is a new way of conducting business (B2B and B2C).
(b) .COMs are declining.
(c) Larger companies are just starting to come on-line and will bring
a continued growth in technology and systems using electronic
networks to perform business.
(d) Government is beginning to take a look at the effect on-line busi-
nesses have on the economy and how they should be regulated.
i. There is a lack of any sort of tax for on-line transactions which
could mean a serious loss of tax revenue for the government.
ii. On-line business is largely unregulated by law. Risks could
transform rapidly into serious legal issues if they are exploited.
(e) Insurance
i. The historical way to deal with risks is to insure against them,
however, there has not been much of an entrance into the
market by large insurance firms.
ii. On the consumer level, credit cards are starting to become
e-commerce aware and deal with the risks of doing business
on-line (American’s idea of third party liability, ”on-line fraud
protection”).
(f) The invasion of technology into all parts of a business’ operation.
3. Social
(a) More and more people are making the Internet a part of their
everyday lives.
(b) People are starting to form purely on-line communities.
(c) On-line companies are advertising in the ”real” world.
(d) People are relying on technology and the Internet to be able to
function in everyday life.
4. Technological
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(a) Pre-packaged ”e-commerce” systems are starting to be heavily
used rather than custom built systems.
(b) More everyday devices are connected to the Internet and other
networks.
(c) Higher bandwidth is available across the access spectrum.
(d) Interaction with computers is moving beyond the screen and key-
board.
(e) There is a centralization of data and computing.
(f) There is an increased accuracy in personal information.
i. Smart Cards
ii. Biometric information
(g) There are more wireless connections.
(h) Autonomous agents are starting to become widely used.
(i) Innovation is surpassing the threshold past which people can un-
derstand all of the interactions taking place.
(j) A wider spectrum of people are using technology.
This list of trends is by no means meant to be exhaustive, but does suggest
that there are a number of trends suggesting that there will be a large amount
of people and businesses concerned with the risks of e-commerce. The po-
tential user base for a site like EcomRISK.org will likely grow dramatically
in the next few years.
2.1.2 SWOT Analysis
The SWOT analysis is an attempt to examine the overall picture of what
resources we have as a group, where our opportunities are, where we are
vulnerable, and what poses a direct threat to our project. The letters in
SWOT stand for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. This is
analysis is an attempt to determine how feasible it is for us to take on a
project of this nature. The paints a picture of the playing field we would
bring our site on to.
1. Strengths
(a) Human Resources (i.e. Smart students, good faculty, etc.)
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(b) Not constrained by business factors (i.e. profits, shareholders,
etc.)
(c) Dartmouth name
(d) Dartmouth resources
(e) Faculty resources
(f) Constant influx of new ideas
(g) Interest from financial sponsors
(h) Non-Profit status
(i) Institute of Security Technology Studies (ISTS) connection
(j) Can use other organizations on campus
2. Weaknesses
(a) D-Plan’s lack of continuity
(b) Lack of business discipline
(c) Lack of experience
(d) Reliance on grants as sources of funding
3. Opportunities
(a) Fill a niche in security web sites
(b) Create a knowledge base that can serve as a teaching tool
(c) Bridge the gap between the academic study of computer science
and the business implementations of these technologies
(d) Enrich the content provided by the GREeCOM.org sites
(e) Provide a quasi-academic setting in which companies can freely
share knowledge allowing them to realize a mutual, as well as
individual, gain
(f) Bring students a valuable extra-curricular activity
(g) Provide the ISTS at Dartmouth a connection to the undergraduate
and graduate students
4. Threats
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(a) Hard to become known among business communities without large
advertising expenditures
(b) Difficult to keep the continuity of the sites maintenance and de-
velopment with the varying staff size and short tenures of staff
(c) E-commerce security is a hot topic which will require us to move
fast if we want to fill our niche
(d) Operating budget is much smaller than most companies
(e) Staff size is much smaller than most companies
(f) Staff are often working on this site while at the same time main-
taining full academic workloads
This analysis shows that we have several strong opportunities to which our
strengths can speak. Also, by examining our weaknesses we have become
aware of what hurdles we must overcome and be constantly vigilant for. It
is also important to have a good idea of what are some direct threats to
our project. We must always be aware of what might potentially make us
obsolete, diminish our value, or prevent us from being successful.
2.2 Mission Statement and Purpose
To serve as a guide in our development I came up with a mission statement
and purpose for EcomRISK.org. As first it may seem odd to break these two
up, however, Collins and Lazier suggest doing so in Beyond Entrepreneurship:
Turning your Business into an Enduring Great Company [7] and I found it
useful.
2.2.1 Mission Statement
Our mission is to become the number-one web site for electronic commerce
risk news and assessment by bring high quality risk classification to business.
2.2.2 Purpose
Our purpose is to create an on-line community for those involved in elec-
tronic commerce which fosters learning about the risks of electronic com-
merce through the sharing of information.
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2.3 Technological and System Goals
Nobody likes boring web pages, least of all people who use computers all day.
As all of the EcomRISK.org developers were aware of this, we strove from
the beginning to create as dynamic a site as possible. A site can be dynamic
because it is constantly updated by human operators or because the code that
runs it constantly generates new content. A human operator is more likely
to make the best choices about what content is relevant, what is valuable,
and where it should be placed. However, one of the weaknesses touched
upon in our SWOT analysis (see Chapter 2.1.2) is that we are chronically
short on people and people may only work on the site for short amounts of
time. Therefore, we decided that one of our main goals would be to create a
dynamic, largely automated site through the use of code.
A second goal was to build a site that used the latest in technology.
This serves two purposes. First, it allows our own site to be a case study
in information storage and management using the latest technologies. The
management of our own site requires us, the developers, to stay on top of
the latest trends in technology in order for us to stay current and relevant
to our audience. No one would buy a computer from a store which used
abacuses to calculate a customer’s bill. Similarly, a web site that claimed
to be “The Source for E-Commerce Risk News & Assessment” would not
provide much interest to the users of the Internet if it did not employ the
latest technologies.
The second purpose of building a web site with the latest technologies
is to serve as an instruction tool for those students who become involved in
its development. By providing a place, albeit small, in the computer science
department that is involved with the latest web technologies, the site offers
the students a chance to get involved in computer science outside of the
classroom. This use of “hot” technology is a strong attraction for students
who, we must interest, as they are are only source of developers.
A third main goal was to build a site that could be used to test different
sorts of data mining techniques. As much of the incidents we are concerned
with collecting center around the use of data, our site’s value would be greatly
increased if we could ourselves showcase some of the latest algorithms and
thinking in the field.
Our fourth and final main goal centered around devising new ways to man-
age the knowledge we acquire through user input. We collect vast amount of
information about users whether it be from their own submissions or our own
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log of what actions they have performed. In some ways this is an extension of
our third goal, but involves separate disciplines. The site attempts to bring
together many separate, but inter-related forms of data. By attempting to
create intuitive ways to view and access the data, we could greatly increase
the visibility, and thus the value, of the data in our site. An example of
this would be to create a meta-search that could be used to query all of the
differing types of data we have in one coherent interface. By allowing a user
one main entry point into the data, we can expose them to data that they
might not have even realized. This also will allow us to examine relations
between data sets that we may not have foreseen.
Chapter 3
Basic Site Architecture
We set out to build a site that created a dynamic, vibrant on-line community
centered around learning and discussion. As discussed in Chapter 2.3, we set
out four main goals that would act as our guiding principles in the devel-
opment of EcomRISK.org. We wanted to build a dynamic, content rich site
that, while showcasing the latest technology, provided a test bed upon which
we could try new data mining and knowledge management techniques. We
had to decide what to use for a base platform, web server software, server-side
scripting language, and database server.
To achieve these goals we set about choosing the best mixture of tried
and new technologies we could. For a base platform for our server, we wanted
to try a new technology and therefore choose Macintosh OS X Server (Mac
OS X Server)1. Mac OS X Server is, at its core, a variant of the Berkeley
Software Distribution of UNIX. Due to our limited budget, it was important
to choose a platform that would allow us to use the wide range of free, open
source tools available on the Internet. Choosing Mac OS X Server allowed
us to download and compile a wide range of freely available software for web
site creation.
Next, we choose the software to actually serve our site. This choice was
fairly simple. The Apache Server2 is the most widely used web server software
on the Internet. The Apache Server is a robust, efficient web server. By
choosing Apache, we left our options for what server-side scripting language
1For more information about Macintosh OS X Server, see its web page at
http://www.apple.com/macosx/server/.
2For more information on the Apache Server, see its web page at
http://www.apache.org/.
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to use wide open.
There are many server-side scripting languages in use across the Internet
and this choice was less obvious. For our own curiosity, we wanted to try a
fairly new technology and thus choose PHP3. As a scripting language, PHP
is very powerful language with C-like syntax. PHP can be intertwined with
HTML code to allow for fast and efficient development. Again, the choice of
PHP left open our choice of database systems.
To round out our server, we needed to find a reliable and fast database
system. We choose MySQL4. MySQL is an open source relational database
management system. Using the prevalent SQL language as its interface,
MySQL fit well into our architecture. PHP has built in routines for accessing
MySQL which allowed for us to tightly integrate the web pages and database.
By choosing Mac OS X Server, Apache, PHP, and MySQL for our web
serving platform, we created a mixture of tired technologies with new ones.
Figure 3.1 shows how a typical page request requiring a database access from
a user’s web browser would be handled by our setup. The steps are outlined
below.
1. A web browser makes a request for a page.
2. The Apache Server receives the request and, after doing some basic
logging, passes it to the PHP module.
3. PHP compiles and runs the script that constitutes the page requested
and makes any and all database queries required by the page. If a page
requires multiple queries, steps 3 and 4 will be repeated as necessary.
4. The MySQL server makes the queries and returns the result set to the
PHP script.
5. The PHP script runs to completion and sends its output back to Apache.
6. Apache then sends the web page back to the client browser.
None of this technology breaks new ground. However, it was not our intention
to do so. We wanted to built a robust system which we could use to reach
our goals.
3For more information on PHP, see its web page at http://www.php.net/.
4For more information on MySQL, see its web page at http://www.mysql.com/.
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Figure 3.1: A diagram of how the server handles the typical page request
One important consideration in the design of our system was its scalibilty.
Currently our system has sufficient response time, however, as the number of
users increases, we will need to modify our design to increase performance.
One of the first changes we could implement to improve performance would
be to move the MySQL database to another machine. This would reduce
load on the main web serving machine. Also, we could consider upgrading
our base platform to one with multiple processors or changing the operating
system to one that supported the clustering of servers. Mac OS X Server
supports machines with up to two processors, but not clusters of machines.
Apache, MySQL, and PHP can also be compiled and run on other UNIX
and Windows operating systems. Therefore, if the need arose, we could
transport the web site with little work to another operating system that
supported machine clustering to increase usage capacity.
Chapter 4
The EcomRISK.org Taxonomy
It is the taxonomy presented in the incident submission system of Ecom-
RISK.org that makes it unique among the web sites on the Internet that
attempt to discuss and address e-commerce. The vision was to create a sys-
tem that returns relevant information concerning the types of e-commerce
problems faced by companies and how they were solved. What is particu-
larly unique about this taxonomy is that it combines technical analysis with
a quantifiable results analysis. A main goal in the creation of the taxon-
omy was to create a classification system so that we could return meaningful
search results for those who wanted to browse our database of incidents.
The questions in the taxonomy may seem odd upon their first reading, but
they attempt to create a coherent framework into which each incident can
be placed.
In this chapter I will first present related work in the field of security
taxonomies and then go into detail about how our taxonomy is structured,
using our incident submission form as a guide. It would be useful to examine
the incident submission form when reading this chapter and it can be found
at http://devlabserver.cs.dartmouth.edu/sites/ecomrisk/cases/ .
4.1 Risk Incident Submission Form
The risk incident form is broken up in to 5 sections: “Submitter Informa-
tion”, “Incident Information”, “Solution Information”, “Quantifiable Rami-
fications”, and “Company Information”. In the following sections I will go
into each section of the form in-depth, explain each question, and how the
18
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answers help classify the incident. Some questions have predefined answers
and others a free-form. The questions with predefined answers allow us a
way to standardize the classification. The free-form questions provide the
submitter the chance to relate the details of a particular incident.
4.1.1 Submitter Information
The first section asks for information about the submitter. To reduce the
number of random incident submissions, we require the user to be logged in
to our site before they can make a submission. In order to login, a user must
have created an account on the GREeCOM.org site. The GREeCOM.org site
handles all of the user registration details so that each of its three member
sites, of which EcomRISk.org is one, can share one user system. During the
registration process a user is required to tell us their e-mail address and their
full name. Optionally, they may also list a mailing address and some other
personal information.
The end result of using the GREeCOM.org’s user registration system
is that the incident form can be light on personal information. The user
does have the option to make the submission anonymous, in which case the
submission is stored with no associated user name, the IP address of the
submitter is not recorded, and the type of browser that is being used is not
recorded. If the submission is not made anonymously, these three pieces of
information are recored simply for logging purposes. The only other question
asked in this section is the user’s relation to the incident they are submitting.
Their are two answers to choose from: “Personally Involved” and “Read
about it in the News”. I ask this question to get some sense of how deeply
involved a person is in the incident they are reporting. Submissions are
not necessarily of less value if the person was not personally involved, they
may simply lack the depth of information that someone who was directly
involved may have. There is a high value in their being a high numbers of
incidents in our database because, the more incidents we are able to collect,
the more valuable searches of our database will be. It is for this reason that
we intentionally did not make personal involvement a requirement.
4.1.2 Incident Information
The second section of the form asks for information about the incident itself.
At the core of each incident lies a computer system and, therefore, when
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attempting to create a classification system I researched the available liter-
ature on computer security taxonomies. It is important to understand that
at the center of every incident lies a computer system flaw. I will discuss the
literature as it becomes relevant to the questions below.
The first question in this section asks, “Where did the cause of this inci-
dent originate?” The submitter must choose either “Internal” or “External”.
This question is to classify the incident by the location of the cause.
This rest of this section’s questions center around classifying the inci-
dent’s computer system flaw. This is by far the most technical part of the
submission process. One of the most useful papers I found on the subject
of computer security taxonomies was A Taxonomy of Computer Program
Security Flaws [8]. It is important to the understanding of the “Incident In-
formation” section to give an overview of the paper here. The Landwehr et
al. paper presents a clear taxonomy for organizing computer security flaws.
All of the incidents we hope to collect have at their root some security flaw.
The authors use three general parameters to classify security flaws: what
was its genesis, when was it introduced, and where was it introduced. The
authors then break down each parameter such that an error fits into one
sub-category in each question. Landwehr’s taxonomy focuses entirely on the
technical side of the question and is extremely useful when attempting to
understand what, technically, occurred. I have chosen to use the Landwehr
taxonomy for this section of the form. I have made slight modifications to
their taxonomy, largely to simplify some of the categories because, some-
times, their granularity is too fine for our uses.
The second question in this section asks about what the result of the
incident was. Landwehr states that “computer security flaws are any con-
ditions or circumstances that can result in denial of service, unauthorized
disclosure, unauthorized destruction of data, or unauthorized modification
of data” (Landwehr et al. 211). I agree with Landwehr’s analysis and will
use his classification system for this taxonomy. It may seem odd at first to
ask what the result was, but it is useful here because it suggests the approach
we are using. All of our incidents are submitted after the fact, and therefore
a certain amount of working from effect to cause is required. There are four
predefined answers for this question.
Denial of Service - A submitter would choose this answer when the
incident resulted in a denial of service to one or more systems. It
is important to note that in the case of a malicious DoS attack,
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the denial of service is both a symptom as well as a result.
Unauthorized Disclosure of Data - This answer would be chosen if
the incident resulted in unauthorized data access. An example of
this might be a hacker cracking a web site’s credit card database
such that they could see user’s credit card information.
Unauthorized Destruction of Data - This answer would be chosen
if the incident resulted in unauthorized destruction of data. An
example of this occurring would be if the user of a system was
allowed to destroy other user’s data without proper authorization.
Unauthorized Modification of Data - This would be chosen if the
incident had resulted in the unauthorized modification of data. An
example incident involving this would be a bank employ being able
to inappropriately change a customer’s balance in the computer
system.
These four categories are prevalent throughout the literature on computer
security flaw taxonomies and provide very good general categories for the
result of an incident.
The first part of Landwehr et al.’s taxonomy focuses on the genesis of
the flaw. As I state the question on the form, “How did it enter the sys-
tem?”. This question has eight predefined answers which come directly from
the Landwehr et at. taxonomy. I have removed the last level of their cate-
gorization because it is too detailed to be of use in our taxonomy. I will also
not explain exactly what each category means for two reasons. First, the are
largely self explanatory, and second the authors of the taxonomy due a much
better job that I could hope to and leave it to the reader to examine their
paper.
• Intentional - Maliciously inserted (Backdoor, Trojan Horse, etc...)
• Intentional - not Maliciously inserted (Covert Channel, etc...)
• Inadvertent - Incomplete or Inconsistent parameter Validation
• Inadvertent - Implicit Sharing of Privileged/Confidential Data
• Inadvertent - Inadequate serialization of process
• Inadvertent - Identification/Authentication Inadequate
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• Inadvertent - Violable Constraint Error
• Inadvertent - Exploitable Logic Error
Just to provide a few examples of how different incidents might fall into these
categories, a DoS attack would fall under the “Intentional - not Maliciously
inserted (Covert Channel, etc...)” category and a web site the allowed ac-
cess to its credit card database would fall into the one of the “Inadvertent”
categories, depending on the exact circumstances. The credit card database
access could be due to poor design and fall into the “Inadvertent - Exploitable
Logic Error” category or may not properly check a user’s privilege , in which
case it would fall into the “Inadvertent - Identification/Authentication Inad-
equate” category. Following this question there is a free-form question that
allows the submitter to explain in detail how the flaw entered the system.
The third question asks “When did it enter the system?” Again, this
question and its answers come from the Landwehr taxonomy. For this cat-
egorization, I left their categorization choices as they state them in their
paper. There are five predefined answers to this question.
• During Development - Requirement/Specification/Design
• During Development - Source Code
• During Development - Object Code
• During Maintenance
• During Operation
To continue with the examples used to describe the “how” question, a DoS
attack would fall into the “During Operation” category and an unautho-
rized access to the credit card database might fall into any of them, depend-
ing upon the exact circumstances. How could the unauthorized credit card
database access fall under any of the categories? Say the database is pro-
tected by a password, perhaps the requirements for the password were no
robust enough and, therefore, easily cracked. This would fall into the “Dur-
ing Development - Requirement/Specification/Design” category. If, instead,
the code did not properly check passwords, it would fall into the “During
Development - Source Code” category. Again, this question is followed by
a free-form question that allows the submitter to describe exactly when the
flaw entered.
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The fifth question asks “Where did it enter the system?” Again, this
question and its answers come from the Landwehr taxonomy. Landwehr’s
classification is of an appropriate detail so I do not amend the categories.
There are eleven predefined answers for this question.
• Software - Operating System - System Initialization
• Software - Operating System - Memory Management
• Software - Operating System - Process Management/Scheduling
• Software - Operating System - Device Management (including I/O,
networking)
• Software - Operating System - File Management
• Software - Operating System - Identification/Authentication
• Software - Operating System - Other/Unknown
• Software - Support - Privileged Utilities
• Software - Support - Unprivileged Utilities
• Software - Application
• Hardware
To keep up the examples used in the previous questions explanations, a DoS
attack would fall under “Hardware”, for it is a router’s or server’s inability
to handle the load, and unauthorized access to a credit card database could
fall under any of the categories. The unauthorized credit card database ac-
cess could be the fault of the operating system not properly authenticating
users, in which case it would fall into the “Software - Operating System -
Identification/Authentication” category, or there may be a utility that rou-
tinely performs a function on the database that is not properly secured, in
which case it would fall under the “Software - Support - Privileged Utilities”
category. This question is followed by a free-form question which allows the
submitter to describe the exact circumstances.
The second to last question of this section seeks to determine how long the
incident effected the system. This is important to determining the severity
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of the incident. Here the submitter is limited to choosing from predefined
questions so that we may categorize the incident.
The final question allows the submitter, in their own words, to describe
the incident and give an overall summary. This free-form questions allows
us to receive detailed information about the unique characteristics of the
incident.
4.1.3 Solution Information
The third section of the form asks for information about what the nature of
the solution to the incident was. Again, the questions in this section are a
mixture questions with free-form and predefined answers. We are attempting
to classify the solution not only by what it took technically to fix, but also
what, if any, policy changes needed to be made to reach a final solution. The
questions concerning policy fixes are meant to extract the underlying policies
that companies run by from the technologies they use. Before I began work
on this section I read two papers which proved to be very useful. The first was
The Remedy Dimension of Vulnerability Analysis by Lindqvist et al. [9] and
the second was A Critical Analysis of Vulnerability Taxonomies by Bishop
and Bailey [10]. I would suggest both to the reader interested in work on
taxonomies in this area.
The first question, “Technically, what did the fix involve?”, has five pre-
defined answers.
Nothing at all - In this scenario the fix to the problem was not tech-
nical. For example, a DoS attack would not require any technical
fix. There are many problems that may just involve changing the
way a company operates and not the technology they use.
Reconfiguration of system - This might be chosen because the in-
cident did not require any re-working of code or design, however
requires a change to the way the system is setup. For example, a
company might have accidently left a web server setup so that it
would provide directory listings, instead of always going to a web
page. This might expose files and data that the company does not
want to be public. In this case, most web servers have a simple
setting to turn this off and fixing it is as simple as changing this
setting.
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Applying a patch - A constant problem in maintaining servers is keep-
ing the programs on them running up-to-date with the latest
patches. Patches are fixes to known bugs that are distributed
by the creator of the software. It is a never-ending job to keep all
programs up-to-date. A user might select this on the form when
the incident was caused by a fault that had already been fixed in
a patch.
A re-design and re-implementation of the system - If a user where
to select this choice it would mean that their original design for
the system was inherently flawed. In order to fix the flaw the
system had to be re-designed and re-implemented using the new
design. An example incident in which the user would choose this
answer would be when a system’s authentication process was de-
signed with a flaw that allowed improper authentication of users
and the only way to fix it was a re-design of the system.
Just a (corrected) re-implementation of current design - This is
similar to the previous answer, however, it certainly happens in
the real world that a design is not flawed, however the implemen-
tation is flawed. This solution requires a re-working of code, but
not a total re-design.
Next we allow a free-form text answer to describe what the solution was,
based on the classification chosen in the previous question. This allows the
user to explain exactly what was required in their technical fix. To round out
the question about the technical fix, we ask for the URLs of any resources
that might have been used in the solution. This provides vital information
about what Internet resources are truly useful for security problems.
Now that the user has told us how, if at all, their technology needed to
be fixed, we ask the same question, except this time we are looking at how
their policies might have changed. Policy may seem somewhat nebulous, but
here refers to the practices used in the running of a system. We have three
predefined answers for “In terms of policy, what did the fix involve?”
Nothing at all - In this scenario the fix to the problem was did not
require a change in the companies policy. This suggests that the
nature of the change lies in the technology used, not the policy
surrounding its operation.
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Re-design of policy - One might choose this when making their sub-
mission because the solution required a change in their policy. An
example of this type of incident would be if a system administrator
noticed a user misusing their account in such a way that was not
wrong, but inappropriate, and had no place higher up in an orga-
nization to bring this information to. The system administrator
may not be tasked with making a decision about the user so they
ignore it. Upon the realization of the problem, the organization
would have to re-design their policy so that there was a place to
bring such information so that it could be dealt with.
Re-education on policy - What a organization decides upon as their
policy towards their systems may not always be followed. Often
their are rules or procedures which are their for show and not used
in real practice. An example of this would be a developer adding
new code to a product without going through the proper channels.
This change may cause a flaw that could have been prevented had
the code gone through review. In this case, an organization would
have to re-educate their programs as to the proper procedures
regarding code changes.
Following this question is a free-form question which allows the submitter to
describe exactly what the policy changes where, if there were any at all.
4.1.4 Quantifiable Ramifications
The purpose of this part of the form is to quantify what the ramifications of
the incident were. This section has two questions: ”How many hours did it
take to analyze and solve the problem?” and “How much revenue was lost as
a result of the incident?”. The first of these questions classifies the risk by its
severity in terms of time. The longer an incident takes to analyze and solve,
the more of a drain on a organization’s resources it is. In this questionnaire
we have created seven predefined answers. They range from “5 hours or less”
to “100 hours or more”. There may also be incidents that take no time to
solve, but still take time to analyze. A DoS attack is a good example of
a situation in which the realization that you were under attack might take
some time, but their is currently no solution you could implement to stop it.
The second question asks about how much revenue was lost as a result of
the incident. This, like the first question in this section, helps to determine
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the ramifications of the incident. Some incidents, while they may take require
drastic measures to fix them, do not, in the long run, cause much harm in
terms of revenue. Loss of revenue is an important factor in determining the
overall affect a incident has.
4.1.5 Company Information
This final section of the incident submission form asks for information about
the company that was involved in the incident. Knowing what business an
incident occurred in can help to create a more detailed picture of the types
of risks faced by different businesses.
Submitters are allowed to make a specific company anonymous, however
they are required to choose what type of business (or businesses) the company
involved in the incident is in. For this question we use the North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS) created by the United States Census
Bureau1. The NAICS is assigned to a business by the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) when it receives their federal tax forms. We are currently
using the 1997 NAICS as this is the standard. This classification system is
not only used in the United States, but also in Mexico and Canada. The
European Union is considering adopting this and will likely do so in 2002.
By using a widely accepted classification system for business types, we can
classify incidents much more accurately, and not rely on someone’s own choice
as to what type of business he or she thinks a business is in.
If a submitter does not choose to make a company anonymous, they may
enter the name of a company, its stock symbol if it is publicly traded, and
an official contact person. The name and stock symbol can help us to find
even more information about a company and aid in further classification of
the incident. The official contact information can help us establish a link to
the company to attempt to open up a dialog about this incident.
As the taxonomy is new, we do not take full advantage of this information.
A future upgrade of the system could take this information and automati-
cally determine a large amount about the company. Also, once the number
of incidents grows, this type of information will greatly aid in generating
statistics about what specific risks are faced by a sector of business.
1For more information about the NAICS you go visit the Census Bureau web site about
it at http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naics.html.
Chapter 5
Other EcomRISK.org Tools
The development of the site did not stop with the creation of the incident
system. In order to become a site which becomes a stop on user’s daily trips
around the news web-sites, we thought it would be critical to sections that
would bring daily content and human interactions on a basis less formal than
the incident system.
Our goal is to create a on-line community in which people can interact
on many different levels. To this end, we added several features to the site
that bring the user the chance to catch up on the latest news, discuss the
news, incident submissions, or anything else relating to e-commerce, read up
about the latest trends in working papers, and in general add to the overall
depth of knowledge available on the site. Moreover, tying the site into the
GREeCOM.org family of sites, it brings a critical piece to the overall center
as a whole.
5.1 Forum
Our choice to use PHP as the server-side scripting language and MySQL as
the database allowed us to choose from many ”off-the-shelf” forum systems.
We decided to use the ”electrifiedForum Version 0.93” released on March 27,
20011 as our starting point. The system consisted of several PHP scripts and
required several tables in the MySQL database.
The system implemented all of the features we desired. There could be
1More information can be found about this system at
http://www.electrifiedpenguin.com/apps/forum.php.
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many top level topics, within which messages could be organized. Replies
to a particular message were ”threaded” so that the user had some sense of
how a series of messages related to one another. The package also included
an searching function to search the messages.
After installing the package I made fairly large modifications to the in-
ternal workings of the system to integrate our user system, in place of the
one provided, and to change the look and feel of the system.
5.2 In the News. . .
Our aim with the “In the News. . . ” section is to provide links to relevant news
stories concerning the Internet. Towards fulfilling its purpose this section
consists of two main news sources. First, we pull down an XML version
of the Slashdot.org home-page every half-hour and parse out the submission
headlines and the links to the submissions. Slashdot.org is a site that contains
news items submitted by users and the runs a threaded discussion off of each
news item. The headlines pulled from Slashdot.org are those typically found
at news web-sites, however, they provide a good snapshot of the hot topics
around the Web from users of the Web. By updated the news stories every
half-hour, the site has at least one section that is updated all the time.
Our second source of news is a daily news briefing prepared by the ISTS
at Dartmouth College. The headlines and links to the articles from this daily
e-mail are manually extracted and inserted into a database table. Currently,
the “In the News. . . ” main page pulls the twenty-five most recent postings
from the database and displays them. The links provided are actually links
to another script, which takes the record ID of the particular news items
database entry as a parameter, counts this click as a “view” and redirects
the browser to the site with the actual news piece. This simple click-counting
method allows us to see which news items people are most interested from
their headlines.
5.3 Working Papers
Towards our goals of becoming an information rich site, we thought it would
be valuable to include working papers of a non-technical nature as a knowl-
edge base on current trends and issues in e-commerce. The working papers
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not only provide a important amount of knowledge for the users of the site
but, also, provide a place for students to become involved in the Ecom-
RISK.org community. At the time of this writing we had over 70 working
papers available on the site.
I constructed a system to handle the submission of working papers (in
PDF format) so it would be easy to search and sort them by author, keyword,
title, abstract, references, or full text. While, currently, only administrators
can upload new working papers, the system is easy enough to use that eventu-
ally it could made available to the public for use at large. A PHP generated
web page provides the interface to upload the papers, providing space to
specify the author, title, abstract, keywords, references, full text of the pa-
per, a PDF file containing the paper, and a PDF file containing presentation
slides if one accompanies the paper. The information about the paper is then
stored in a database table and the file is stored in a directory inaccessible to
the web-server. Each paper is given a unique identifier2 so that the author
can reference it.
Any user can search the database of papers seeing the paper’s title, au-
thor, abstract, and keywords. Only a registered user can download the paper.
A user can download the paper after accepting an agreement concerning the
acceptable uses of the paper. Once again, the download link in fact links to
PHP script so that we can store in our database which users download which
papers to what IP address at what time.
5.4 Resources
Perhaps the section with the least realized potential, the resources section is
meant to provide users with a list of sites that we have found to be useful.
The list of sites in this section comes from ones found by us, the developers.
For each link we have specified several pieces of information.
Level - In this category a site can either be ’top’ or ‘specific’. This clas-
sification is meant to deal with whether this resource is a general
one, such as a whole web-site, or just one page from a web-site.
2This identifier looks like “WP-EC-010329-18”. The letters “WP” stand for working
paper. The letters “EC” stands for EcomRISK.org. The 6 digit number is the data upon
which the paper was submitted in the form YYMMDD. The last number states that it
was the eighteenth paper submitted that day.
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Type - A site can be one of seven types: ‘news’, ‘background’, ‘re-
search’, ‘solutions’, ‘certification’, ‘conference’, or ‘legal’. This is
meant to classify the sites by what type of content it holds. A site
may be one or many of these types.
Description - This is a small description about a site either taken
directly from a site’s own pages or written by the contributer.
The intention of this section is to provide a short description of
what the resource contains.
Keywords - These are always determined by the contributer. The
intention is for there to be a fairly small number of keywords that
characterize what the resource contains.
These classification fields allow a user to create more meaningful searches
when they are looking for specific information. While the site does not cur-
rently take full advantage of this extensive classification, the framework ex-
ists.
Again, as with so many other parts of the site, when a user clicks on a
link to a resource, they are in fact click on a link to another PHP script which
counts this click as a “view” and redirects them to the page. This provides
us with valuable information as to which resources users find useful based on
the information we have provided.
5.5 Other GREeCOM.org Sites
As discussed in the section entitled Project History (see Chapter 1.1), Ecom-
RISK.org is just a part of a larger family of sites. The parent site, GREeCOM.org
is responsible for controlling user registration and provides a central point
to navigate to the parts of any of the other sites. some of the sites contain
deep links into the features on one of the other two sites. To give the reader
a general sense of the feature set in GREeCOM.org, I will give a cursory
examination of the main features of the other two sites.
5.5.1 eJETA.org
eJETA.org’s main feature is a database of refereed papers written on the
latest research methods, tools and applications in electronic commerce by
experts in the field. These papers will come form a wide range of disciplines.
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As the site states, one of its main goals is to ”To develop an interdisci-
plinary international forum which has a scientific basis and which provides
technology transfer between university research and commercial/industrial
communities.”
This database of papers will provide an important knowledge base for
the users of EcomRISK.org. The papers can be cross-referenced with the
incident database in EcomRISK.org to provide a user the latest news and
information on a particular risk.
5.5.2 DePolicy.org
DePolicy.org’s has two main features. First, the site provides comprehensive
evaluations of web sites that offer on-line courses, training, and certification
on e-commerce issues. EcomRISK.org users might be very interested in this,
as they are business professionals. The second feature of DePolicy.org is its
own self testing system. Using a quiz system developed by Mason Kortz, a
user may take quizzes on a wide variety of topics dealing with e-commerce
using their web browser. The quizzes are short and all of the questions are
multiple choice. Upon completion of the quiz, the user is not only told how
many questions he or she answered correctly and incorrectly, but also a list of
resources that provide more information about questions that were answered
incorrectly. These resources can often be found on other GREeCOM.org sites
and provide a way to encourage participation in the center as a whole.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Project Status and Future Work
As of June 1, 2001 the site will be live and open for anyone on the Internet
to use. As of this date, the system as a whole should be considered to be
in a version 1.0 release. However, in order to realize the full potential of the
site, there is still much more work that can be done. Our main goal was to
have the site in a stable state with a fairly comprehensive feature set. The
underlying framework of the site has been designed such as to limit as little
as possible the directions future developers want to take the site.
Under Professor Makedon’s guide the team involved with the GREeCOM.org
project has continued to grow and there is no doubt that the site will continue
to be expanded and move in new directions.
6.2 Personal Conclusions
Over the past nine months I have learned a great deal working on this project.
From computer risk taxonomies to business analysis, this project has dramat-
ically expanded my experience at Dartmouth College. I have greatly enjoyed
being able to work with fellow computer science students, both undergrad-
uate and graduate. I look forward to watching EcomRISK.org growing over
the next few years.
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